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Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 10
Metaethical absolutism, or just absolutism, is the view that moral concepts have non-relative satisfaction conditions that are constant across judges and their particular beliefs, attitudes, and cultural embedding. Absolutism is compatible with a variety of more widely discussed views about moral semantics-descriptivist and non-descriptivist, naturalist and non-naturalist, realist and constructivist-but it arguably has more practically important consequences than either of these. If absolutismdoi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738695.003.0007 fatcat:bxwzy5bm6bdlnbin2maue7n3ye