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InDret 4/2000 Litigation Effects of Scheduling Awards for Personal Injury. Who should Decide What I Get Paid?

Jesús Pintos Ager, Jesús Ageri
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Introduction • Section I: Dispute resolution and parties' predictions • Section II: Incentives for litigation before and after tort reform being passed 1. The liability regime prior to reform a. Error 1: Optimism (distancing of the means of the estimates) b. Error 2: Uncertainty about the expected award (high variance) 2. Effects of the legal reform capping and scheduling damages a. Effect 1: Reduction of optimism (regrouping of the means) b. Effect 2: More homogeneous awards (reduction of the
more » ... ariances) 3. Litigation costs and risk aversion 4. To sue or not to sue a. Effect 1: Reduction of optimism (decrease in the estimate's mean value) b. Effect 2: More homogeneous awards (reduction of the estimate's variance) • Section III: Concluding remarks
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Jesús Pintos Ager, Jesús Ageri. "InDret 4/2000 Litigation Effects of Scheduling Awards for Personal Injury. Who should Decide What I Get Paid?."