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Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium
2009
Journal of computer and system sciences (Print)
Strategic games may exhibit symmetries in a variety of ways. A characteristic feature, enabling the compact representation of games even when the number of players is unbounded, is that players cannot, or need not, distinguish between the other players. We investigate the computational complexity of pure Nash equilibria in four classes of symmetric games obtained by considering two additional properties: identical payoff functions for all players and the ability to distinguish oneself from the
doi:10.1016/j.jcss.2008.09.001
fatcat:ybqpp5eejbci7h47ganirgrxjm