A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2010; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is application/pdf
.
Who is Afraid of the Friedman Rule?
2005
Social Science Research Network
We explore the connection between optimal monetary policy and heterogeneity among agents. We utilize a standard monetary economy with two types of agents that differ in the marginal utility they derive from real money balances-a framework that produces a nondegenerate stationary distribution of money holdings. Without type-specific fiscal policy, we show that the zero-nominal-interest-rate policy (the Friedman rule) does not maximize type-specific welfare; further, it may not maximize aggregate
doi:10.2139/ssrn.630508
fatcat:bh4gdm2bvzcbfmb2k5xhson4va