Who is Afraid of the Friedman Rule?

Joydeep Bhattacharya, Joseph Haslag, Antoine Martin, Rajesh Singh
2005 Social Science Research Network  
We explore the connection between optimal monetary policy and heterogeneity among agents. We utilize a standard monetary economy with two types of agents that differ in the marginal utility they derive from real money balances-a framework that produces a nondegenerate stationary distribution of money holdings. Without type-specific fiscal policy, we show that the zero-nominal-interest-rate policy (the Friedman rule) does not maximize type-specific welfare; further, it may not maximize aggregate
more » ... ex ante social welfare. Indeed one or, more surprisingly, both types of agents may benefit if the central bank deviates from the Friedman rule.
doi:10.2139/ssrn.630508 fatcat:bh4gdm2bvzcbfmb2k5xhson4va