SECOND-PERSONAL REASON-GIVING [chapter]

Fabienne Peter
Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol 90 – 2014  
David Enoch has recently objected to Stephen Darwall's account of second--personal reason--giving that the phenomena that Darwall focuses on can be fully explained without resorting to second--personal reasons. In this paper, I shall argue, against Enoch, that second--personal reason--giving matters. My account of second--personal reason--giving differs from Darwall's however, as it accepts that some of the phenomena Darwall focuses on can be reduced to the more standard form of reason-giving.
more » ... of reason-giving. trying to make. I have also benefitted greatly from Herlinde Pauer--Studer's and Kimberley Brownlee's suggestions.
doi:10.1163/9789004298767_004 fatcat:z6jp2eubnrdytddylh2skk7afy