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Vassar College Digital Window @ Vassar The political economy of conditionality: an empirical analysis of World Bank Enforcement The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank enforcement
Traditional aid conditionality has been attacked as ineffective in part because aid agencies-notably the World Bank-often fail to enforce conditions. This pattern undermines the credibility of conditionality, weakening incentives to implement policy reforms. The standard critique attributes this time inconsistency to bureaucratic factors within the aid agency such as pressure to lend, defensive lending, or shortsighted altruism. Pressure from powerful donors provides another potentialfatcat:3ndioki42ranph6z7efeg4pdna