The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation

Nuno P. Monteiro, Alexandre Debs
2013 Social Science Research Network  
Word count: 18,814 Prepared for presentation at the Princeton International Relations Faculty Colloquium on October 7, 2013. Please feel free to cite but do not quote or circulate without the explicit permission of the authors. Abstract When do states acquire nuclear weapons? Intuitively, security is the main motivation behind nuclear acquisition. Yet, existing security-based theories of proliferation cannot explain why some states with important security concerns nuclearize whereas others do
more » ... t. This article offers a strategic theory that accounts for variation in the nuclear status of states with dire security threats. We focus not only on the security goals of the potential proliferator, but also on those of its enemies, and, when present, its allies. A state only acquires nuclear weapons when, besides having grave security threats, it possesses high relative power or a nuclear ally it deems prospectively unreliable. While relatively weak states without a nuclear ally lack the opportunity to nuclearize, those with a reliable nuclear ally lack the willingness to do so. We test our theory using original codings of enemies and allies for all historical instances of nuclear development and trace its logic in the Soviet, French, Pakistani, Swedish, South Korean, and Iraqi cases. We conclude with implications for U.S. counter-proliferation policy towards Iran.
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2354079 fatcat:7uiqiap2brczhk6vrixvq5o4ke