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The Response to Incentives and Contractual Efficiency: Evidence from a Field Experiment
2007
Social Science Research Network
We investigate the efficiency of piece-rate contracts using data from a field experiment, conducted within a tree-planting firm. During the experiment, the piece rate paid to planters was exogenously increased. Regression methods yield an estimate of the elasticity of output with respect to changes in the piece rate of 0.39. Regression methods are limited in their ability to predict the performance of alternative contracts. Therefore, we apply structural methods to interpret the experimental
doi:10.2139/ssrn.962146
fatcat:ilwuxqgw6zb2bbkkgqdzmnqgjm