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A game-theoretic approach to quality control for collecting privacy-preserving data
2015 53rd Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton)
We consider the design of an incentive mechanism for a principal, who is assumed to be not trustworthy, to collect informative data from privacy-sensitive individuals. The principal offers payments to incentivize participation and informative data reporting. The individuals are strategic and take into account both the payment and the cost for privacy loss during data reporting. Due to privacy concerns, an individual may be willing to report only a "noisy" version of the private data, resultingdoi:10.1109/allerton.2015.7447042 dblp:conf/allerton/WangYZ15 fatcat:e2vajfzzl5awvox2frbwvswwvm