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Price of Fairness in Budget Division and Probabilistic Social Choice
2020
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE TWENTY-EIGHTH INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
A group of agents needs to divide a divisible common resource (such as a monetary budget) among several uses or projects. We assume that agents have approval preferences over projects, and their utility is the fraction of the budget spent on approved projects. If we maximize utilitarian social welfare, the entire budget will be spent on a single popular project, even if a substantial fraction of the agents disapprove it. This violates the individual fair share axiom (IFS) which requires that
doi:10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5594
fatcat:wq2lxcyqqvg2vo4n2c6yvk2qta