A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2022; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is
Experiments of Multiobject Auctions:
The Journal of Economics
This paper shows the experimental results for multi-object auctions in terms of efficiency, revenue, and bidders' payoffs. We assume that there are two heterogeneous objects and two bidders, and that each bidder does not know the other bidder's material payoff structure. We conducted the laboratory experiments for eight payoff structures associated with complements and substitutes. We compare three types of auction formats, i.e., sequential first price auction, clock auction, and VCG mechanism.doi:10.32173/jeut.79.1_17 fatcat:w5q3r57m7nbwpbt6crq64c5qwu