Can One Love the Distant Other? Empathy, Affiliation, and Cosmopolitanism

Gregory R. Peterson
2015 Philosophy, Theology and the Sciences  
An ongoing debate in political and moral philosophy concerns the nature of international obligations. While cosmopolitans argue that duties of justice are independent of national borders, statists argue otherwise, sometimes basing their account on the limitations of our empathic concern, a line of argument found much earlier in Adam Smith. Although critics argue that empathy is neither necessary nor sufficient for morality, and although statists imply that psychological limitations of the kind
more » ... hat would be based in empathy prevent the realization of commitments to distant others beyond humanitarian aid, I argue that both these views are incorrect. While the possession of cognitive and emotional empathy is clearly not sufficient for being moral, the requirement for cognitive empathy arises out of a proper understanding of moral functioning, and the need for emotional empathy arises out of a natural necessity due to the kind of affiliative, biological creatures that we are. Since our capacities for cognitive and emotional empathy are not simply innately given but capable of being shaped by processes of learning and culture, statist arguments against stronger moral obligations across nations are poorly founded. Let us suppose that the great empire of China, with all its myriads of inhabitants, was suddenly swallowed up by an earthquake, and let us consider how a man of humanity in Europe, who had no sort of connection with that part of the world, would be affected upon receiving intelligence of this dreadful calamity. He would, I imagine, first of all express very strongly his sorrow for the misfortune of that unhappy people. ... And when all this fine philosophy was over, when all these humane sentiments had been once fairly expressed, he would pursue his business or his pleasure, take his repose or his diversion, with the same ease and tranquility as if no such accident had happened. The most frivolous disaster which could befall himself would occasion a more real disturbance. Adam Smith ([1759] 2009, 161)
doi:10.1628/219597715x14268452692861 fatcat:fjfsd5vhhzarnpfq5mlrfkhus4