Security proofs for an efficient password-based key exchange

Emmanuel Bresson, Olivier Chevassut, David Pointcheval
2003 Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communication security - CCS '03  
Password-based key exchange schemes are designed to provide entities communicating over a public network, and sharing a (short) password only, with a session key (e.g, the key is used for data integrity and/or confidentiality). The focus of the present paper is on the analysis of very efficient schemes that have been proposed to the IEEE P1363 Standard working group on password-based authenticated key-exchange methods, but for which actual security was an open problem. We analyze the AuthA key
more » ... xchange scheme and give a complete proof of its security. Our analysis shows that the AuthA protocol and its multiple modes of operation are provably secure under the computational Diffie-Hellman intractability assumption, in both the random-oracle and the ideal-cipher models.
doi:10.1145/948109.948142 dblp:conf/ccs/BressonCP03 fatcat:gzxg2f2subfrdlhmhderu4jd5i