A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2020; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is application/pdf
.
Preventing Your Faults From Telling Your Secrets: Defenses Against Pigeonhole Attacks
[article]
2016
arXiv
pre-print
New hardware primitives such as Intel SGX secure a user-level process in presence of an untrusted or compromised OS. Such "enclaved execution" systems are vulnerable to several side-channels, one of which is the page fault channel. In this paper, we show that the page fault side-channel has sufficient channel capacity to extract bits of encryption keys from commodity implementations of cryptographic routines in OpenSSL and Libgcrypt --- leaking 27% on average and up to 100% of the secret bits
arXiv:1506.04832v2
fatcat:arnizxazvfahzejmtqvwbfmq6q