An axiomatic characterization of the potential decisiveness index

Josep Freixas, Montserrat Pons
2015 Journal of the Operational Research Society  
Let us consider that somebody is extremely interested in increasing the probability of a proposal to be approved by a certain committee and let us assume that for achieving this goal he/she is prepared to pay off one member of the committee. In a situation like this one, and assuming that vote-buying is allowed and free of stigma, which voter should be offered a bribe? The potential decisiveness index for simple games, which measures the effect that ensuring one positive vote produces in the
more » ... bability to pass the issue at hand, is a good tool to get the answer. An axiomatic characterization of this index is given in this paper, and its relation to other classical power indices is showed.
doi:10.1057/jors.2014.5 fatcat:7tio6lnlp5aepje5rmsgygtuc4