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Does CEO Pay Dispersion Matter in an Emerging Market? Evidence from China's Listed Firms
Social Science Research Network
This paper examines how the institutional features of emerging economies (i.e., government ownership, political connections, and market reform) influence CEO pay-dispersion incentives. Consistent with our expectation, we find that CEO pay dispersion generally provides a tournament incentive in China's emerging market, as it is positively associated with firm performance. In addition, tournament incentives are weaker where firms are controlled by the government and where the CEO is politicallydoi:10.2139/ssrn.2492884 fatcat:rh2euitfyndt5jm5f3yxdnmoa4