Entrepreneurial Risk Choice and Credit Market Equilibria

Kerstin Gerling, Michal K. Kowalik, Heiner Schumacher
2010 Social Science Research Network  
We analyze under what conditions credit markets are efficient in providing loans to entrepreneurs who can start a new project after previous failure. An entrepreneur of uncertain talent chooses the riskiness of her project. If banks cannot perfectly observe the risk of previous projects, two equilibria may coexist: (1) an inefficient equilibrium in which the entrepreneur undertakes a low-risk project and has no access to finance after failure; and (2) a more efficient equilibrium in which the
more » ... trepreneur undertakes high-risk projects and gets financed even after an endogenously determined number of failures.
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1703683 fatcat:ssor6zt34nbn5iomrusrtrtvxa