On a Logic for Coalitional Games with Priced-Resource Agents

Dario Della Monica, Margherita Napoli, Mimmo Parente
2011 Electronical Notes in Theoretical Computer Science  
Due to the nesting of the team operators in a formula, the agents can be provided with a new endowment of resources to perform subtasks A η A η ′ 3p agents of team A, equipped with the endowment of resources η, can force the next state to be s.t. they can guarantee that p eventually holds equipped with the new endowment η ′ 3 Model checking ◮ PSPACE-hardness ◮ Recover decidability even if actions produce resources ⋆ actions may produce a resource in a quantity that is not greater than the
more » ... ater than the amount that has already been consumed so far ⋆ the global availability of the market will never be greater than the initial global availability ⋆ several significant real-world scenarios fit (e.g., acquiring memory by a program, leasing a car during a travel) 4 Optimization problem ◮ minimization of the amount of money needed to acquire the resources to perform a task On a Logic for Coalitional Games with Priced-Resource Agents (CILC 2011) D. Della Monica Our contributions -cont'd 3 Model checking ◮ PSPACE-hardness ◮ Recover decidability even if actions produce resources ⋆ actions may produce a resource in a quantity that is not greater than the amount that has already been consumed so far ⋆ the global availability of the market will never be greater than the initial global availability ⋆ several significant real-world scenarios fit (e.g., acquiring memory by a program, leasing a car during a travel) 4 Optimization problem ◮ minimization of the amount of money needed to acquire the resources to perform a task On a Logic for Coalitional Games with Priced-Resource Agents (CILC 2011) D. Della Monica Our contributions -cont'd 3 Model checking ◮ PSPACE-hardness ◮ Recover decidability even if actions produce resources ⋆ actions may produce a resource in a quantity that is not greater than the amount that has already been consumed so far ⋆ the global availability of the market will never be greater than the initial global availability ⋆ several significant real-world scenarios fit (e.g., acquiring memory by a program, leasing a car during a travel) 4 Optimization problem ◮ minimization of the amount of money needed to acquire the resources to perform a task On a Logic for Coalitional Games with Priced-Resource Agents (CILC 2011) D. Della Monica Our contributions -cont'd 3 Model checking ◮ PSPACE-hardness ◮ Recover decidability even if actions produce resources ⋆ actions may produce a resource in a quantity that is not greater than the amount that has already been consumed so far ⋆ the global availability of the market will never be greater than the initial global availability ⋆ several significant real-world scenarios fit (e.g., acquiring memory by a program, leasing a car during a travel) 4 Optimization problem ◮ minimization of the amount of money needed to acquire the resources to perform a task On a Logic for Coalitional Games with Priced-Resource Agents (CILC 2011) D. Della Monica Our contributions -cont'd 3 Model checking ◮ PSPACE-hardness ◮ Recover decidability even if actions produce resources ⋆ actions may produce a resource in a quantity that is not greater than the amount that has already been consumed so far ⋆ the global availability of the market will never be greater than the initial global availability ⋆ several significant real-world scenarios fit (e.g., acquiring memory by a program, leasing a car during a travel) 4 Optimization problem ◮ minimization of the amount of money needed to acquire the resources to perform a task
doi:10.1016/j.entcs.2011.10.017 fatcat:o3xqaouz4vdrxd2swvncj6gc5a