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The inherent inefficiency of simultaneously feasible financial transmission rights auctions
2010
Energy Economics
Empirical evidence shows that the clearing prices for point-to-point congestion revenue rights, also known as financial transmission rights (FTRs), resulting from centralized auctions conducted by Independent System Operators differ significantly and systematically from the realized congestion revenues that determine the accrued payoffs of these rights. The question addressed by this paper is whether such deviations are due to price discovery errors which will eventually vanish or due to
doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2010.01.010
fatcat:qhsi6bzjzjbvvgmrrikkf7gkvi