1899 Mind  
HBW BOOKS. himself to commit the sin that doth so easily beset a lecturer, that of reiteration and labouring his point. An^| on the other h^n^ there are portions of the book (e.g., the note on the Association of Ideas and the. chapter on the Philosophy of the Absolute) where the discussion is either too oondensed to be useful to the student or too general to be adequate to the subject. Of course the improvement of the book in this respect would mean ita enlargement, and even the most
more » ... the most comprehensive books, have spatial limits. Without attempting to discuss the book in detail, one may remark, upon the excellence of Prof. Wataon's exposition and his acute yet. sympathetic criticism in the chapters and notes which refer to Descartes, and Kant, and in the notes on " The Platonic and Aristotelian Criticism of Phenomenalism" and on the views of Aristotle and Hegel regarding; the principle of identity. This last note and the note on Descartes and Kant are the most valuable parts of the new material in the volume. The treatment of Mr. Spencer's position is also very clear and fair, and the exposition and criticism of Mill is on the whole very good, although on particular points (e.g., the question of the inconceivability of the opposite as a test of truth) Prof. Watson's argument seems to some extent open to objection. In the new matter there are several things which, apart from their general value, will be of.special interest to readers of MIND. In a note on "Agnosticism and Scepticism," Prof. Watson argues acutely against the scepticism of Mr. Alfred Sidgwick, as expressed in an article in MIND (N.S., voL in.), and in another note on "The Feeling Soul" there is a very interesting appreciation and criticism of Mr. Bradley'* remarkable article in MIND (O.S., vol. iii.), in course of which, with much justice, Prof. Watson suggests that Mr. Bradley^ position seems to imply the introducing intoPsyohology of the " preformation " theory of development, which has been discredited, in biology. Again, in an admirable discussion of Lotze's theory of knowledge, Prof. Watson traces to the influence of Lotze the distinction which Mr. Bradley draws between ideas as ' events' and as having-' content,' a distinction which, in the form in which it is made, has had a baneful efieqt on the argument both of the Principles of Logic and of Appearance and Reality. Mention ought also to be made of the note on "The Problem of-Human Freedom," in which there is some excellent criticism of the Kantian element in the work of T. H, Green. Such discussions as these make the book much more than a mere, manual for students. While the main argument runs on familiar lines, it has the freshness that comes of contact with present questions. Edinburgh : James Thin, 1898. Pp. ii-, 442.
doi:10.1093/mind/viii.2.266 fatcat:vwse6lvqanhdthlhq4r4nyw3fm