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Implementing virtual secure circuit using a custom-instruction approach
2010
Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Compilers, architectures and synthesis for embedded systems - CASES '10
Although cryptographic algorithms are designed to resist at least thousands of years of cryptoanalysis, implementing them with either software or hardware usually leaks additional information which may enable the attackers to break the cryptographic systems within days. A Side Channel Attack (SCA) is such a kind of attack that breaks a security system at a low cost within a short time. SCA uses sidechannel leakage, such as the cryptographic implementations' execution time, power dissipation and
doi:10.1145/1878921.1878933
dblp:conf/cases/ChenSS10
fatcat:thy3ceorg5bvteb5pudoh2simi