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The monopolist's theory of optimal single-item auctions for agents with independent private values can be summarized by two statements. The first is from Myerson : the optimal auction is Vickrey with a reserve price. The second is from Bulow and Klemperer : it is better to recruit one more bidder and run the Vickrey auction than to run the optimal auction. These results hold for single-item auctions under the assumption that the agents' valuations are independently and identically drawndoi:10.1145/1566374.1566407 dblp:conf/sigecom/HartlineR09 fatcat:3x2wsmdr65d2vo7pixjrxjwo3q