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Individually Rational, Balanced-Budget Bayesian Mechanisms and the Informed Principal Problem
2004
Social Science Research Network
We investigate the issue of implementation via individually rational ex-post budgetbalanced Bayesian mechanisms. We demonstrate that all social choice rules that generate a nonnegative ex-ante surplus, including ex-post efficient ones, can generically be implemented via such mechanisms for any profile of the utility functions. The aggregate expected surplus in these mechanisms can be distributed in an arbitrary way. Also generically, any ex-post efficient social choice rule can be implemented
doi:10.2139/ssrn.628621
fatcat:35ps5lahy5aolja2r2gthq5mzm