Bounded-concurrent secure multi-party computation with a dishonest majority

Rafael Pass
2004 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '04  
We show how to securely realize any multi-party functionality in a way that preserves security under an a-priori bounded number of concurrent executions, regardless of the number of corrupted parties. Previous protocols for the above task either rely on set-up assumptions such as a Common Reference String, or require an honest majority. Our constructions are in the plain model and rely on standard intractability assumptions (enhanced trapdoor permutations and collision resistant hash
more » ... Even though our main focus is on feasibility of concurrent multi-party computation we actually obtain a protocol using only a constant number of communication rounds. As a consequence our protocol yields the first construction of constant-round stand-alone secure multi-party computation with a dishonest majority, proven secure under standard (polynomial-time) hardness assumptions; previous solutions to this task either require logarithmic round-complexity, or subexponential hardness assumptions. The core of our protocol is a novel construction of (concurrently) simulation-sound zero-knowledge protocols, which might be of independent interest. Finally, we extend the framework constructed to give a protocol for secure multi-party (and thus two-party) computation for any number of corrupted parties, which remains secure even when arbitrary subsets of parties concurrently execute the protocol, possibly with interchangeable roles. As far as we know, for the case of two-party or multi-party protocols with a dishonest majority, this is the first positive result for any non-trivial functionality which achieves this property in the plain model.
doi:10.1145/1007352.1007393 dblp:conf/stoc/Pass04 fatcat:zq2zrxbhnrfa7j5yrlg422cufa