Overcoming Omniscience in Axelrod's Model

Samhar Mahmoud, Jeroen Keppens, Michael Luck, Nathan Griffiths
2011 2011 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology  
Norms are a valuable mechanism for establishing coherent cooperative behaviour in decentralised systems in which no central authority exists. In this context, Axelrod's seminal model of norm establishment in populations of selfinterested individuals [1] is important in providing insight into the mechanisms needed to support this. However, Axelrod's model suffers from significant limitations: it adopts an evolutionary approach, and assumes that information is available to all agents in the
more » ... agents in the system. In particular, the model assumes that the private strategies of individuals are available to others, and that agents are omniscient in being aware of all norm violations and punishments. Because this is an unreasonable expectation, the approach does not lend itself to modelling realworld systems such as peer-to-peer networks. In response, this paper proposes alternatives to Axelrod's model, by replacing the evolutionary approach, enabling agents to learn, and by restricting the metapunishment of agents to only those where the original defection is perceived, in order to be able to apply the model to real-world domains.
doi:10.1109/wi-iat.2011.162 dblp:conf/iat/MahmoudKLG11a fatcat:opgw42jtbzcktpijn6czla2y5i