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Abstracts of Working Papers in Economics
2003
Abstracts of Working Papers in Economics
AB We construct a simple model where political elites may block technological and institutional development, because of a "political replacement effect." Innovations often erode elites' incumbency advantage, increasing the likelihood that they will be replaced. Fearing replacement, political elites are unwilling to initiate change, and may even block economic development We show that elites are unlikely to block development when there is a high degree of political competition, or when they are
doi:10.1017/s0951007900006069
fatcat:2xvyn2ei3rfynkh5ku4ssehk7u