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Coalition formation processes with belief revision among bounded-rational self-interested agents
1999
Journal of Logic and Computation
This paper studies coalition formation among selfinterested agents that cannot make sidepayments. We show that -core stability reduces to analyzing whether some utility pro le is maximal for all agents. We also show that the -core is a subset of strong Nash equilibria. This fact carries our stability results directly over to three strategic solution concepts. The main focus of the paper is on analyzing the dynamic process of coalition formation by explicitly modeling the costs of communication
doi:10.1093/logcom/9.6.793
fatcat:dn7rbtq3ord6rkl42pckvbrkdy