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Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol 92 – 2015
This paper discusses Michael Dummett's criticism of the Neo-Fregean conception of the context principle. I will present four arguments by Dummett that purport to show that the context principle is incompatible with platonism. I discuss and ultimately reject each argument. I will close this paper by identifying what I take to be a deeprooted tension in the Neo-Fregean project which might have motivated Dummett's opposition to the Neo-Fregean use of the context principle. I argue that thisdoi:10.1163/9789004310841_003 fatcat:6ri6npuog5envkiogs53mydwdm