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Simultaneous Auctions of Imperfect Substitute Goods by Sellers of Different Reputations
2008
Social Science Research Network
This paper studies settings where a number of sellers of different reputations for honesty simultaneously offer sealed-bid, second-price, single-unit auctions for imperfect substitute goods to unit-demand buyers. Among other applications, these settings can serve as an abstraction of largescale decentralized Internet auction marketplaces, such as eBay. I characterize the form of the bidding equilibria and derive expressions for the corresponding allocative efficiency and expected seller
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1115805
fatcat:l7cviwwlyfhufhhkd2ah4too3m