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Coincidence of Condorcet committees
2017
Social Choice and Welfare
The Condorcet Committee à la Gehrlein (CCG) is a xed-size subset of candidates such that each of its members defeats in a pairwise contest any candidate outside. The Condorcet Committee à la Fishburn (CCF) is a xedsize subset of candidates that is preferred to all other subsets of the same size by a majority of voters. In general, these two types of Condorcet committees may not always exist. Kaymak and Sanver (2003) studied the conditions under which the CCF exists under a large class of
doi:10.1007/s00355-017-1079-z
fatcat:no6w6sn2dnfq7fucng6yd2zfpa