Rhule v. Seaboard Air Line Railway Company. Supreme Court of Appeals: At Richmond. January 21, 1904

1904 The Virginia Law Register  
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more » ... ntent at http://about.jstor.org/participate--jstor/individuals/early-journal--content. JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not--for--profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. 1904.] RHULE V. SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. CO. 963 "If, therefore, in construing the sentence in question, you substitute the words 'if, in any case,' for the word 'whenever,' at the beginning of the sentence, I think it will seem somewhat plainer that that sentence is not intended to be restricted to those cases involving constitutional questions. "I cannot but think that the language in section 88 shows not only that the last sentence was not intended to be limited to cases involving constitutional questions, but that it was not even intended to apply to such cases, because the sentence immediately preceding it, had already provided that the assent of at least three judges should be required to decide any constitutional question, and that, if, in any case, not as many as three judges could agree upon a constitutional question, the case should be heard again before a full court. From this I think it reasonably clear that, so far as cases involving constitutional questions are concerned, the last sentence of section 88, was entirely unnecessary because the sentence before it had already made a similar provision for such cases. "From this, it will be seen that the last sentence was not necessary to be adopted, except with reference to cases which did not involve such questions-similar provisions, for cases which did involve such questions, having already been made by the next preceding sentence. "My recollection is that the term 'requisite majority' was used in the last sentence of section 88, merely for brevity-it being recognized by the draughtsman that, in cases which did not involve constitutional questions, a majority of the court sitting might be two judges in some instances, and three judges in another, according to the number of judges sitting. Therefore, instead of saying: " 'Whenever two judges (where only three are sitting) or three judges (where four or five are sitting) are unable to agree, &c.,' "it simply said: "'Whenever the requisite majority (whatever that might be-whether two or three) were unable to agree, &c.' "For these reasons, independent of my fairly distinct recollection of the facts, I have no doubt whatever, that the last sentence of section 88 was not intended to be limited to cases involving constitutional questions, if, indeed, it was even intended to apply to such cases at all." RHULE V. SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY COMPANY.* Absent, Cardwell, J: 1. EJECTMENT-Plaintiff's title-Trespasser. A plaintiff in ejectment must, as a general rule, recover on the strength of his own title and not on the * Reported by M. P. Burks, State Reporter. 1904.] RHULE V. SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. CO. 963
doi:10.2307/1101118 fatcat:3g7j63kslrc3xb7nzkkbhlwioi