Combinatorial Models for Multi-Agent Scheduling Problems [chapter]

Alessandro Agnetis, Dario Pacciarelli, Andrea Pacifici
2007 Multiprocessor Scheduling, Theory and Applications  
Scheduling models deal with the best way of carrying out a set of jobs on given processing resources. Typically, the jobs belong to a single decision maker, who wants to find the most profitable way of organizing and exploiting available resources, and a single objective function is specified. If different objectives are present, there can be multiple objective functions, but still the models refer to a centralized framework, in which a single decision maker, given data on the jobs and the
more » ... m, computes the best schedule for the whole system. This approach does not apply to those situations in which the allocation process involves different subjects (agents), each having his/her own set of jobs, and there is no central authority who can solve possible conflicts in resource usage over time. In this case, the role of the model must be partially redefined, since rather than computing "optimal" solutions, the model is asked to provide useful elements for the negotiation process, which eventually leads to a stable and acceptable resource allocation. Multi-agent scheduling models are dealt with by several distinct disciplines (besides optimization, we mention game theory, artificial intelligence etc), possibly indicated by different terms. We are not going to review the whole scope in detail, but rather we will concentrate on combinatorial models, and how they can be employed for the purpose on hand. We will consider two major mechanisms for generating schedules, auctions and bargaining models, corresponding to different information exchange scenarios.
doi:10.5772/5213 fatcat:c7rtp6ivnffvjn2cuwuqvurd4y