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Valence Advantages and Public Goods Consumption: Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position?
2006
Social Science Research Network
Does a disadvantaged candidate always choose an extremist program? When does a less competent candidate have an incentive to move to extreme positions in order to differentiate himself from the more competent candidate? If the answer to these questions were positive, as suggested in recent work (Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) , Aragones and Palfrey (2002) , Groseclose (1999) , and Aragones and Palfrey (2003) ), this would mean that extremist candidates are bad politicians. We consider a two
doi:10.2139/ssrn.907443
fatcat:zswwxziizjdi5kjoza66g5fmbi