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Modularity and greed in double auctions
2014
Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation - EC '14
Designing double auctions is a complex problem, especially when there are restrictions on the sets of buyers and sellers that may trade with one another. The goal of this paper is to develop "black-box reductions" from doubleauction design to the exhaustively-studied problem of designing single-sided mechanisms. We consider several desirable properties of a double auction: feasibility, dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility, the still stronger incentive constraints offered by a
doi:10.1145/2600057.2602854
dblp:conf/sigecom/DuttingRT14
fatcat:oceszlchvzhl5k75nnar7d7ttu