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Imperfect Legal Unbundling of Monopolistic Bottlenecks
2007
Social Science Research Network
We study an industry with a monopolistic bottleneck supplying an essential input to several downstream firms. Under legal unbundling the bottleneck must be operated by a legally independent upstream firm, which may be partly or fully owned by an incumbent active in downstream markets. Access prices are regulated but the upstream firm can perform non-tariff discrimination. Under perfect legal unbundling the upstream firm maximizes only own profits; with imperfections it is biased and to some
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1068802
fatcat:3agvzv6gyvejtoopikkanz4bme