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Manipulating Moral Dumbfounding: Inhibiting the Identification of Reasons for a Moral Judgement
[post]
2019
unpublished
Moral dumbfounding occurs when people defend a moral judgement even though they cannot provide a reason in support of this judgement. It manifests as an admission of not having reasons, or the use of unsupported declarations ("it's just wrong") or tautological reasons ("because it's incest") as justifications for a judgment. We test a dual-processes explanation of moral dumbfounding, where moral dumbfounding is an example of conflict between a habitual response (making a judgement) and a
doi:10.31234/osf.io/e5gj7
fatcat:kdrkwgnnujbgdadjw77usefrgi