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Defending Against Speculative Attacks: Reputation, Learning, and Coordination
2011
Social Science Research Network
How does the central bank's incentive to build a reputation affect speculators' ability to coordinate and the likelihood of the devaluation outcome during speculative currency crises? What role does market information play in speculators' coordination and the central bank's reputation building? I address these questions in a dynamic regime change game that highlights the interaction between the central bank's reputation building and speculators' individual learning. On the one hand, the central
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2022028
fatcat:ktkxtke4xfcipp33khben62aka