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Lecture Notes in Computer Science
In this paper, we propose an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol under the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption with respect to the strengthened eCK-security (seCK-security) of Sarr et al.. To date, many AKE protocols either are provably secure under a rather strong and nonstandard assumption named as the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption, or fall to practical attacks on the intermediate result leakage which can be captured by the seCK model. In order to remove the gapdoi:10.1007/978-3-642-24316-5_27 fatcat:j53mo6cjafg6xeynbmqfwwmsf4