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On Multi-dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms
[chapter]
2009
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
We study the problem of fairness design. Specifically, we focus on approximation algorithms for indivisible items with supporting envy-free bundle prices. We present the first polynomial-communication envy-free profit-maximizing combinatorial auctions for general bidders. In this context, envy-free prices can be interpreted as anonymous nondiscriminatory prices. Additionally, we study the canonical makespanminimizing scheduling problem of unrelated machines, in an envy-free manner. For the
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-04428-1_11
fatcat:jqemyi6csjgzvfzsfvftyzc6bm