DieHarder

Gene Novark, Emery D. Berger
2010 Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security - CCS '10  
Heap-based attacks depend on a combination of memory management errors and an exploitable memory allocator. We analyze a range of widely-deployed memory allocators, including those used in Windows, Linux, FreeBSD, and OpenBSD. We show that despite numerous efforts to improve their security, they remain vulnerable to attack. We present the design and security analysis of DieHarder, a memory allocator that provides the highest degree of security from heap-based attacks of any practical allocator.
doi:10.1145/1866307.1866371 dblp:conf/ccs/NovarkB10 fatcat:mv4tr5h3crbkzbz3lqo2d7u3nm