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Making Masking Security Proofs Concrete
[chapter]
2015
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
We investigate the relationships between theoretical studies of leaking cryptographic devices and concrete security evaluations with standard side-channel attacks. Our contributions are in four parts. First, we connect the formal analysis of the masking countermeasure proposed by Duc et al. (Eurocrypt 2014) with the Eurocrypt 2009 evaluation framework for side-channel key recovery attacks. In particular, we re-state their main proof for the masking countermeasure based on a mutual information
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-46800-5_16
fatcat:6osh7j6upveutezcycxko3cs7y