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We consider the problem of computing a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) in resource graph games (RGGs), a compact representation for games with an exponential number of strategies. In an RGG, each player's pure strategy is a subset of resources, represented by a binary vector, and her pure strategy set is represented compactly using a set of linear inequality constraints. Given the pure strategies of the players, each player's utility depends on the resource graph and the numbers of timesdoi:10.24963/ijcai.2018/21 dblp:conf/ijcai/ChanJ18 fatcat:5hs7oh44n5aolnztwrbe6mz4ea