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On the Round Complexity of Randomized Byzantine Agreement
[article]
2022
arXiv
pre-print
We prove lower bounds on the round complexity of randomized Byzantine agreement (BA) protocols, bounding the halting probability of such protocols after one and two rounds. In particular, we prove that: (1) BA protocols resilient against n/3 [resp., n/4] corruptions terminate (under attack) at the end of the first round with probability at most o(1) [resp., 1/2+ o(1)]. (2) BA protocols resilient against a fraction of corruptions greater than 1/4 terminate at the end of the second round with
arXiv:1907.11329v4
fatcat:q3qns77n2fcbdg3rqed4gg3adq