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Frontal Attack: Leaking Control-Flow in SGX via the CPU Frontend
[article]
2021
arXiv
pre-print
We introduce a new timing side-channel attack on Intel CPU processors. Our Frontal attack exploits timing differences that arise from how the CPU frontend fetches and processes instructions while being interrupted. In particular, we observe that in modern Intel CPUs, some instructions' execution times will depend on which operations precede and succeed them, and on their virtual addresses. Unlike previous attacks that could only profile branches if they contained different code or had known
arXiv:2005.11516v4
fatcat:2zgok2qltbcoji3v2uixdkrvgu