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Flush, Gauss, and Reload – A Cache Attack on the BLISS Lattice-Based Signature Scheme
[chapter]
2016
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
We present the first side-channel attack on a lattice-based signature scheme, using the Flush+Reload cache-attack. The attack is targeted at the discrete Gaussian sampler, an important step in the Bimodal Lattice Signature Schemes (BLISS). After observing only 450 signatures with a perfect side-channel, an attacker is able to extract the secret BLISS-key in less than 2 minutes, with a success probability of 0.96. Similar results are achieved in a proof-of-concept implementation using the
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-53140-2_16
fatcat:zbdwqatmzvdidmizhlvbko6esa