Parent and Child. Support of Child. Liability of Parent. Smith v. Gilbert, 98 S. W. 115 (Ark.)

1907 The Yale law journal  
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more » ... ntent at http://about.jstor.org/participate--jstor/individuals/early-journal--content. JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not--for--profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. RECENT CASES of his original sentence even though the time of his original sentence has elapsed. The pardoning power of the president in this country as specified in Act. II., Section 2 of the Federal Constitution is not subject to any legislative control. U. S. v. r Wilson, 7 Pet. (U. S.)15 o; Ex parte Wells, I8 How. (U. S.) 307. So also the governor, in all the states, either solely or with others, has the power to conditionally pardon persons convicted of crimes, other than impeachment and treason, by virtue of his state constitution. People v. Potter, i Park (N. Y.) 47. This pardoning power, however, is not necessarily an executive function, but resides where the Const. places it, and in the absence of legislation, it vests no more power in the executive than in the legislative or judicial department. State v. Nichols, 26 Ark. 74. One who claims the benefit of a pardon must be held to strict compliance with its conditions. Haym v. U. S., 7 Cir. Ct. 443; Warney v. U. S., 7 id. 50o. Hence it is a general rule in England and in this country that the pardon, in the case of a condition precedent, does not take effect and in the case of a condition subsequent becomes void, and the criminal may be re-arrested and compelled to finish his original sentence, though the time of such sentence has elapsed. Cor. v. Halsfield, 2 Pa. L. J. 37; Coles's Case Moo K. B., 466. But if the condition annexed thereto is illegal or impossible the condition is void and the pardon becomes absolute. Lee v. Murphy, 12 Am. Rep. 563. In the absence of statute or express provision in the pardon the person charged with violating the conditions of his pardon has the constitutional right to be examined and tried like any other person charged with crime. People v Moore., 62 Mich. 497. But the accused is not entitled to a jury trial, as a matter of right, except upon the question, whether he is the same person who was convicted. Exparte Alvarez, 39 So. 481; State v. Wolfer, 53 Minn. I35. However, it has been held that the violation of a condition in a pardon is a question of fact and may be properly determined by the verdict of a jury. People v. Burns,
doi:10.2307/785422 fatcat:a3l2aznwhrgkljgk7bz466qpre