A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2015; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is application/pdf
.
Analysing the Information Flow Properties of Object-Capability Patterns
[chapter]
2010
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
We consider the problem of detecting covert channels within security-enforcing object-capability patterns. Traditional formalisms for reasoning about the security properties of object-capability patterns require one to be aware, a priori, of all possible mechanisms for covert information flow that might be present within a pattern, in order to detect covert channels within it. We show how the CSP process algebra, and its model-checker FDR, can be applied to overcome this limitation.
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-12459-4_7
fatcat:c7xaa46kq5ejjmbfv3rfjnzzyy