Altruistic kidney exchange

Tayfun Sönmez, M. Utku Ünver
2010 Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory on Conference on Future Directions - BQGT '10  
Although a national live-donor kidney exchange program was recently launched in the US, the kidney shortage is increasing faster than ever. A new solution paradigm is able to incorporate compatible pairs in exchange. In this paper, we consider an exchange framework that has both compatible and incompatible pairs, and patients are indifferent over compatible pairs. Only two-way exchanges are permitted due to institutional constraints. We explore the structure of Pareto-efficient matchings in
more » ... nt matchings in this framework. The mathematical structure of this model turns out to be quite novel. We show that under Pareto-efficient matchings, the same number of patients receive transplants, and it is possible to construct Pareto-efficient matchings that match the same incompatible pairs while matching the least number of compatible pairs. We non-trivially extend the famous Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition in the combinatorial optimization literature to our new framework.
doi:10.1145/1807406.1807479 dblp:conf/bqgt/SonmezU10 fatcat:r4cknunl65hpxppxqdb35u4hbm