A Noção de Intencionalidade nas Investigações Lógicas de Husserl

Andre Vinicius Dias Senra
2009 PHENOMENOLOGICAL STUDIES - Revista da Abordagem Gestáltica  
Husserlian Phenomenology as the aim to offer philosophical foundation for the general knowledge, seeks to avoid, at the same time, both psychologism and logicism. Although the Phenomenological inquiry intends to clear the cognoscitive relationship from logic clarification of sense, however, its purpose does not deal with the philosophical activity as an analytical one from linguistics, but it infers that philosophy must properly own its method, questions and objects, independently from any
more » ... ently from any other rational knowledge/wisdoms. As to the Phenomenological view, the overcoming of psychologism is not related only to the affirmation that the access to the objectivity relies on the recognizing of the ideal sphere as being independent from sensibility. Husserl understood that the problem was that the basis for cognitive arguing had so far maintained its focus, on the transcendent object in the same way, and analogically that the intuitive apprehension from this object could only be made by the empirical subject. The fact that the objectivity belongs to an independent sphere, in reference to sensible aspects a theory of pure subjectivity becomes indispensable, in order to be possible, in a correct way, to make the significant correspondence that knowledge relation requires. If the I that experiences sensibly is not neutralized, it is not possible to coherently justify the noetic apprehension of objectivity as pure possibility and hence there may not be foundational, precisely because the knower is not found free from contact with transcendence.
doi:10.18065/rag.2009v15n2.14 fatcat:xvxjts3pm5gtze5e2lja5gfma4