A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2020; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is application/pdf
.
Deception by Design: Evidence-Based Signaling Games for Network Defense
[article]
2015
arXiv
pre-print
Deception plays a critical role in the financial industry, online markets, national defense, and countless other areas. Understanding and harnessing deception - especially in cyberspace - is both crucial and difficult. Recent work in this area has used game theory to study the roles of incentives and rational behavior. Building upon this work, we employ a game-theoretic model for the purpose of mechanism design. Specifically, we study a defensive use of deception: implementation of honeypots
arXiv:1503.05458v3
fatcat:uc2gkuawbzhi3beyf2jopudrpm